I. Introduction
This paper examines "market discipline!' of off-balance sheet activities (OBSA) by employing option-pricing models to calculate bank asset risk. OBSA have been growing rapidly in recent years. Total OBSA gre~{ from 1. 4 Off-balance sheet banking refers to banking products and practices not related to traditional forms of portfolio lending. Such OBSA involve earning fee incomes by means of transactions that are not registered on bank's balance sheets. As a result of its OBSA. a bank faces three general types of portfolio risk: credit risk on underwritten guarantees, interest rate risk due to asset and hability mismatches on commitment takedmVlls and interest rate s\{aps, and liquidity risk due to the over-extension of obligations.
Banks are required to report OBSA to the FDIC beginning 1984. Due to data availability problems, the literature on off-balance sheet activities and their risk has primarily been theoretical.
A key rationale for OBS banking capital regulation is an assumed information asymmetry between bank managers and liability holders. The regulatory presumption IS that such DBS activities are risky and the market fails to recognize the risk embodied in such DBS activities. The "market discipline" studies of DBS banking risk have addresed the question of whether market prices of bank liabilities reflect the risk of DBS activities. If "market discipline" exists and off-balance sheet activities are found to be risk-sensitive, bank liability holders can distinguish DBS banking risk. The assumed information asymmetry rationale for capital regulation of DBS activities, therefore, becomes less convincing.
The standard approach used to determine if market prices of uninsured liabilities reflect the risk of DBS activities is to regress the relative costs of bank funds against on-balance and off-balance measures of risk. This approach is inadequate because uninsured bank liabilities or equities are subordinated claims whose costs are not linear or monotonic functions of bank risk. jIoreover, this approach fails to account for the fact that banks are regulated. The fact that regulators may apply solvency rules in I.ays different from investors complicates the valuation of subordinated claims.
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the impact of "market discipline II on DBS risk by modeling closure rules explicitly and using contingent claims pricing to compute the implied variance of bank assets. This paper calculates bank asset risks two ways and regresses these market-determined asset risks over on-balance and off-balance activities. First, this research calculates implied bank asset variance given the contingent claims nature of equity and deposit insurance (Ronn-Verma, 1986 ). Second, this paper calculates implied asset variance given default-risk premia and subordinated debt optIon pricing model (Gorton and Santomero, 1988) . Once implied asset variances are calculated~ these asset risks I.ill be regressed over on-balance accounting measures of risk ln addition to OBSA to examine "market discipline ll of such OBSA. The underlying premise of this study is that bank equity-holders and subordinated debt-holders are more exposed to OBS risk than deposit-holders. Therefore, their assessment of the riskiness of OBS activities is realistically determined.
II. Previous Research and Importance of this Study
The empirical evidence of the "market discipline ll of OBS banking activities is inconclusive. Lynge and Lee (1987) 
where up to a certain point beyond complete erosion of net worth, but also are perceived by the market to have such an effect. They assume, hOl.;ever, that some hypothetical limit of erosion of value exists such that revival becomes too costly. This hypothetical limit can be expressed as a percentage of total debt of the bank. This also alters the boundary condition to be applied to the equity, construed as a call option. The closure rule is therefore modeled as follows: the FDIC liquidates a bank if V T < pB where V T is the terminal value of assets at time T and p < = 1 is a policy parameter. Given this modified closure rule and the standard options-theoretic relationship bet\.;een the instantaneous variances of the derivative and underlying assets, the equity of the bank holding company can be \.;ritten as:
.yT (3) E ~v = uE YN(x) \{here £ is the market pnce of equity and 0"£ is the instantaneous standard deviation of the return on E. Here equity is a fully dividend-protected call because being the recipient of dividends, equity is in fact dividend-protected.
Equations (2) and (3) can be solved simultaneously for the tiW unknOi,ns, V and O"v' for each observed E and O"E' Ronn and Verma show that a p of .97 yields an aggregate deposit premium weighted average of about 1/12 percent, the flat rate premium over the data period in this study.
The maturity of debt (T) is assumed to be one year ln empirical calculation of models (2) and (3). The equity value refers to the maturity of debt while the deposit insurance refers to periodicity of audit by the insurer. In a regulatory environment, the rational investor would link the debt maturity to audit periodicity. These ti,O maturities cannot be separated in the context of banks because insured deposits account for a large part of the bank1s debt and new deposits made with a bank before the expiration of the insurance are automatically covered by the insurance. At audit time, if the FDIC decides to dissolve the bank, all depositors are paid off. It is therefore reasonable to argue that the time until next audit should be the proper value of maturity (assumed to be 1) in both equations (2) and (3).
The implied variance of bank assets captures the riskiness of a bank and is the underlying driving variable in this study. Ronn and Verma (1986) pricing equations can be extended in the context of OBS banking activities by including OBS items into total debt because not all risks assumed by a bank appear on its book. The implied variances \{ill be regressed over bank on-balance and off-balance sheet activities to test for their risk-taking.potential.
The Valuation of Asset Risk Under Default-risk Premia
The second measure of asset risk used in this study is in the spirit of Gorton and Santomero (1989) If a firm finances itself solely with pure discount debt and equity, then Merton (1~74) has shown that the default risk premium on the firm's debt, expressed as the spread bet"een the yield on the risky debt (R) and the yield on riskless debt (R f ) of the same maturity is
IS the volatility of the logarithm of assets of bank: R is the yield on subordinated debt and debentures; R f is the yield on Treasuries of the same maturity; V is the value of the bank's assets; T is the maturity of subordinated debt (assumed to be 1); B is the face value of debt; N(·) is the univariate cumulative normal distribution function. Note that the risk premium, R-R f , is a function of leverage (V/B) , time to maturity (T) and asset variance (~2). In the case of a homogeneous debt issue, the greater the volatility of the firm's assets, the higher the default risk-premium.
Given the default-risk premium and other necessary information, the above
prIcIng formula for subordinated debt is inverted to find the volatility, ~~,
implied by that default-risk premium. T\;o volatility measures \Yill be calculated. The first volatility measure treats bank debt as homogeneous, imposes a one-year maturity and subordinated debt to assets minus insured debt as the leverage variable. The second volatility measure also treats bank debt as homogeneous, imposes a one-year maturity but uses subordinated debt plus OBS debt to assets minus insured debt as the leverage variable.
Calculations of implied asset variances require the usual assumptions made by Black-Scholes. A maintained assumption of the Black-Scholes option pricing model is that ~2 is constant and normally distributed. The applicability of contingent claims model in discrete time has been demonstrated by Gorton and Santomero (1989) in their "market discipline" study of bank risk. :\Ioreover, the interest rate is assumed to be nonstochastic. Ronn and Verma (1986) show that relative contribution of interest rate variance to overall variance appears small.
In addition, the follolYing assumptions are used for calculations of implied variances.
1. Deposit insurance is fairly priced;
2. Aggregation of a bank's multiple issues of subordinated debt by weighted average of yields and maturities is a good approximation.
3. Insured bank debt has the same maturity as subordinated debt.
The assumption that deposit insurance is fairly priced has received empirical support from Pennachi (1987) . The fact that some banks have multiple issues of debt with different maturities necessitates the second assumption. closure rule can be adopted about the behavior of regulatory authority. Jlerton (1978) assumed that banks are audited each year and banks will be closed if, at audit time, its assets to deposit ratio is belo~i one. Ronn and Verma (1986) also assume an annual audit ~iith an exogenously given assets-to-deposits ratio below which the bank is closed. The maturity of debt, used in this study, is effectively one year because banks are audited each year. :At examination time, the stockholders have the choice of satisfying the regulatory criteria or forfeiting the bank to the regulators.
IV. Data and Empirical Results

Empirical Model
The follo,.ing accounting-based risk model is estimated over cross-section and time-series data using the generalized least squares (GLS) technique. The expected signs of partial derivatives appear on each independent variable.
IYhere ~ = implied bank asset risk as previously described; oBS = seven variables constructed from all oBS banking activities included Similar off-balance sheet groupings are also done by Lynge and Lee (1988) .
These variables are reported in Table 2 SIG~U2 is calculated in the same way as SIGMA1, except that the leverage ratio is augmented by DBS debt. The mean value of ISGJIA2 is smaller than that of SIGMA1. This can be explained by the call feature of equity value. As the face value of debt is augmented by DBS items: the value of equity decreases at the closure date. Because the call value is directly related to asset variance, a lower asset variance is associated with a decreased call value. Table 3 . These risk-premia are then used as the dependent variables in regression analysis of on-balance and off-balance measures of bank risk.
Analysis of Results
Calculation of Bank Asset Risk
The average risk-premium for each BRC for each year is used as the input ln Two asset variances were calculated. SIGMA1 treats bank debt as homogeneous, imposes a one-year maturity and uses subordinated debt to assets less insured debt as the leverage variable. SImrA2 is the same as SImIA1 ~ except that the leverage variable is subordinated debt plus OBS debt to assets minus insured debt, because not all risks assumed by a bank appear on its balance sheet. Results are presented using both measures of risk, and they are generally consistent. Table 6 reports the results of regression coefficients when the dependent variable is the direct risk measure. SIGjIA1 is the implied asset variance The "market discipline" of OBS banking activities has been reexamined by using contingent claims valuation models to derive explicit pricing formulae which incorporates regulatory closure rules for bank subordinated debt (Gorton-Santomero, 1989 ) and bank equity with deposit insurance (Ronn-Verma, 1986 ). Specifically, implied variances have been calculated and regressed over on-balance and off-balance measures of bank risk. These implied asset variances are better than equity variance or risk-premia in proxying total risk because they consider both the nonlinear nature of contingent claims model and the impact of closure rules.
Analysis of Results
The major empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows.
All seven off-balance measures of risk in this study are risk-reducing depending on the proxy used for total risk. Four off-balance sheet ~tems (AOBS, ACLC, ASLC and ACOJal) are always risk-reducing regardless of the proxy used for total risk. There is clear evidence of a "market discipline" of OBS banking risk. or swapped n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Amount of recourse exposure on these mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a nla Private residential mortgage loans n/a n/a n/a n/a nla DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold n/a n/a n/a n/a nla Amount of recourse exposure on these mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Farmer ~Iac agricultural mortgage loan pools DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Amount of recourse exposure on these mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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